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Cooperative Brains: Psychological Constraints on the Evolution of

Altruism

Jeffrey R. Stevens and Marc D. Hauser

Imagine an individual called "hunter" that expends a good deal of energy to capture
a gazelle. As the hunter is consuming his small prey, a second individual called "recipient" approaches and begins feeding peacefully alongside the hunter. A few weeks later
the roles reverse, such that the previous recipient has now captured a gazelle, and the
previous hunter is taking advantage of the recipient's hard work. Could the hunter
and recipient be Maasai warriors? Is it equally likely that they are common chimpanzees, African lions, or Nile crocodiles? All of these species hunt gazelle and live in
groups, so why would this scenario apply to some species more appropriately than to
others? The answer lies in the costs and benefits associated with sharing food with
non-kin. Assuming that one individual can consume the entire gazelle, sharing food
with the reCipient constitutes an altruistic act-the hunter accepts a fitness cost (reduction in food intake) while increasing the fitness of another (increasing the intake of
the recipient).
Reciprocal Altruism: Cooperation via Turn Taking

Here we focus on a form of altruistic cooperation with interesting psychological implications: reCiprocal altruism (or reciprocity)-the alternation of donor and reCipient
roles in repeated altruistic interactions. When Trivers (1971) first introduced the
concept of reciprocal altruism, he outlined necessary prerequisites such as a large
benefit to the recipient and a small cost to the donor, many opportunities for cooperative interactions, and the ability to detect cheaters. Humans appear to satisfy these
requirements quite nicely.l Intuitively, reciprocity seems fundamental to human social
interactions, and experiments confirm this intuition, demonstrating its prevalence
across different economic contexts (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Henrich, 2003;
Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003; McCabe, 2003), as well as across cultures (Henrich
et al., 2001). In fact, some argue that it is so integral to human society that we
have evolved specialized cognitive mechanisms to facilitate reciprocal interactions
Published in FROM MONKEY BRAIN TO HUMAN BRAIN, edited by Stanislas Dehaene,
Jean-Rene Duhamel, Marc D. Hauser, & Giacomo Rizzolatti (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2005), pp. 159-187.
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including especially, the detection of cheaters (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) and punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2000).
Given that reciprocity is common in humans, emerges fairly early in development
(Harbaugh, Krause, & Liday, 2002; Harbaugh, Krause, Liday, & Vesterlund, 2003), and
that the prerequisites appear trivial, should we expect to see it in nonhuman animals?
In this chapter, we address this question by developing the following argument. First,
we argue that the prerequisites for reciprocal altruism have been underestimated. A
careful dissection reveals a host of underlying mechanisms that may be necessary for
both initiating a reciprocal relationship and for maintaining it over the long haul.
Second, we argue that some of the essential psychological ingredients for reciprocation include numerical quantification, time estimation, delayed gratification, detection and punishment of cheaters, analysis and recall of reputation, and inhibitory
control. For example, reciprocal altruism requires inhibitory control in order to
suppress the temptation to cheat: once B has received from A, B must inhibit the
temptation to defect in order to return the favor and maintain a stable cooperative
relationship. Reciprocal altruism also requires, by definition, patience: if A gives to B,
A must wait some period of time before B returns the favor. And reciprocal altruism
may require quantification: A and B may quantify the resources exchanged, potentially across different currencies, in order to evaluate whether the exchange was
fair. If reciprocity is, indeed, as cognitively complex as we suggest, then we must
anchor our theoretical predictions about adaptive function in realistic constraints
imposed by neural and psychological design features. Third, because of these limitations, we predict that reciprocal altruism will be rare in the animal kingdom, and
when it appears, will represent a relatively minor force in the evolution of social
organizations. Returning to our opening paragraph, although reciprocal altruism represents a theoretical solution to the problem of altruism between unrelated individuals, does the crocodile, lion, or chimpanzee have the cognitive wherewithal for
reciprocity?
We begin by critically discussing the empirical evidence for reciprocity in animals.
For some, we will appear highly critical. We feel this level of analysis is necessary in
order to show what we know about cooperation in animals and what we have yet to
learn; hopefully, the fact that we are equally critical of our own work as that of others,
will make the exercise seem fair. This discussion leads to the conclusion that animals
can maintain stable cooperation for mutual, simultaneous benefits, but rarely if ever
sustain stable, reciprocally altruistic relationships that entail delayed benefits. We next
turn to an explanation of this conclusion, focusing on a suite of cognitive constraints.
Finally, we turn to a brief discussion of some of the neurophysiological substrates that
might support reciprocation in humans, and use this evidence to speculate about the
neural correlates of cooperation in animals.
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Reciprocal Altruism: Theoretical Concerns

After Trivers's initial investigation, the concept of reciprocity remained all but
untouched until Axelrod and Hamilton's (1981) description of "tit-for-tat" as a possible reciprocal strategy that allows for stable cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma
(Flood, 1958; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). In the Prisoner's Dilemma, two individuals each have the opportunity to cooperate with or defect against each other, resulting in four possible fitness payoffs for each player (figure 9.1). Mutual cooperation
results in a moderate reward (R), but mutual defection leads to very low payoffs for
both players (P). When one cooperates and the other defects, the defector receives the
largest possible reward (T) and the cooperator receives the smallest possible reward (5).
Therefore, the optimum strategy (Nash equilibrium) for playing a single-shot game is
to defect, because defection results in a higher payoff than cooperation regardless of
the opponent's choice. Axelrod and Hamilton, however, suggested that stable cooperation can emerge if the game is played repeatedly, the opening move is nice (cooperative), and from that point on, each player copies the other's moves. This winning
strategy is a version of reciprocity called tit-for-tat. Following this analysis, a flood of
theoretical investigations emerged, some confirming the efficacy of reciprocity, others
providing alternative strategies that maintain cooperation (reviewed in Dugatkin,
1997).
Empirical Evidence for Reciprocal Behavior

Following the deluge of theory, reciprocity was invoked to explain many instances of
animal cooperation. Here we describe case studies that examined putative reciprocal
situations, including blood sharing in vampire bats, cooperative games in blue jays,
and food exchange in capuchin monkeys and tamarins. Because of space constraints,
we leave out the many other interesting cases that have been described, including the
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Figure 9.1

Fitness payoffs in Prisoner's Dilemma game-payoffs R, T, P, and S represent payoffs to the row
player against the column player (e.g., T is the payoff to a defector playing against a cooperator). To qualify as a 'Priso~r's Dilemma, T > R > P > S. Therefore, regardless of the opponent's
choice, defection results in'larger payoffs, but mutual cooperation is more profitable than mutual
,
defection.
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exchange of grooming for alliance support in vervet monkeys (Seyfarth & Cheney,
1984) and reciprocal grooming in antelope and many primates (Hart & Hart, 1992;
Muroyama, 1991).
Blood Sharing in Vampire Bats

Vampire bats can live for almost 20 years, spending much of their time in large, stable
social groups where there are multiple opportunities to interact with the same individuals. A vampire bat's survival depends critically on the consumption of blood. If
an individual goes for more than 60 hours without a blood meal, it dies. On any given
day, therefore, an individual must either obtain its own meal or convince another bat
to regurgitate some of its undigested blood. This suite of attributes makes vampire bats
ideal subjects for studies of reciprocal altruism (Wilkinson, 1984).
Wilkinson (1984) observed more than 100 regurgitations in a wild population of
vampire bats. Because blood is valuable, giving it up represents a cost-an act of altruism. Of the cases observed, most were between mother and infant. These were not
examined in any detail because there's no puzzle: regurgitating to your offspring makes
sense since you share half of your genes with them; there is no expectation of reciprocation here. Of the remaining regurgitations, only 20 percent were between more
distant relatives or nonrelatives, and of these, most occurred among bats that frequently spent time together. However, since many of these individuals were genetic
relatives (half at the level of grandparent-grandchild), it seems that regurgitation is
largely motivated by kinship, with an extremely small proportion of cases among
genetically unrelated bats. Nonetheless, given that some regurgitations were delivered
to non-kin, these cases require some explanation. There are two possibilities: either
some bats made mistakes, failing to recognize their kin and thus accidentally giving
blood to non-kin, or they purposefully gave blood to non-kin with the expectation
that they would receive blood back in the future.
To better understand what motivates regurgitations among non-kin, and to clarify
whether giving is contingent upon receiving, Wilkinson (1984) conducted a simple
experiment with eight unrelated vampire bats. Over many days, he removed one bat
from the colony before feeding while providing the other bats with two hours of access
to blood. He then returned the now starving bat to the blood-satiated bats. The pattern
of blood sharing was clear: individuals regurgitated blood to those who had regurgitated to them in the past.
There are four reasons why we want to express caution in accepting the vampire
bat case as evidence of reciprocal altruism, even though many authors have trumpeted
these observations as some of the best evidence to date (Dugatkin, 1997; Hauser, 2000).
One: the number of naturally observed cases is small and can be explained as errors
of recognition as opposed to reciprocation among non-kin. Though regurgitations are
given to unrelated animals, these are infrequent, and there is no evidence that indi-
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viduals recognize the recipients as non-kin as opposed to kin. Wilkinson did not
conduct any tests to show that bats recognize their kin, and if so, to what degree of
relatedness. The consequence of contingent regurgitation may benefit non-kin, but
the payoffs and mechanisms may have evolved for kin, occurring among non-kin as
a by-product. Two: the number of experimental cases is also small, and might reflect
an artificial outcome, an exchange that is more important in captivity when bats
have less certainty with respect to their next meal. Three: even if we accept these few
cases, it is not at all clear whether reciprocal altruism among non-kin plays a significant or trivial role in individual survival. The fact that individuals need blood to
survive is clear. Whether or not they depend upon reciprocation with non-kin to
survive is a different issue. It may well be that individuals would survive fine without
it, relying on their own skills, and the good nature of their relatives. Four: only one
study has ever attempted to replicate these findings, even though 20 years has elapsed
since their original publication. Denault and McFarlane (1995) observed regurgitations
among vampire bats, but the degree of relatedness was close to the level of grandparent-grandchild, thereby allowing kinship to account for the pattern of altruistic
behavior.
Experimental Games in Blue Jays
A second approach to testing for reciprocal altruism in animals comes from work on
captive blue jays trained to peck keys in one of two classical economic games. In most
instances of cooperative behavior in animals, the fitness costs and benefits of cooperation remain unclear. This ambiguity makes it difficult to determine whether the
animals face a true Prisoner's Dilemma or whether some other benefits to cooperation
actually reduce the temptation to cheat. To circumvent these uncertainties, Stephens
and colleagues (Clements & Stephens, 1995; Stephens, McLinn, & Stevens, 2002;
Stevens & Stephens, 2004) have devised ecologically artificial but economically relevant situations in which blue jays play cooperative games. Their paradigm involves
placing pairs of jays in adjacent operant chambers in which each individual simultaneously chooses to cooperate or defect by pecking a key (figure 9.2A). Once both subjects pecked a key, each received a specific number of pellets associated with the game's
payoff matrix. Fbr example, in a Prisoner's Dilemma matrix, when both cooperated
each received three pellets (R), when both defect each received one pellet (P), and
when one cooperated and the other defected, the defector received five pellets (T) and
the cooperator received no pellets (5). In the second game, called "Mutualism," the
payoffs for mutual cooperation were higher than for all other possibilities, and the
payoffs for mutual 'defection were lower than for one player defecting and the other
cooperating. When the j~ys played a Prisoner's Dilemma game, they rapidly defected.
In contrast, when the jars switched to a game of Mutualism they not only cooperated
but maintained this pattern over many days. That jays switch strategies as a function
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Figure 9.2
Stephens et al. (2002) tested cooperation in an operant experiment with blu~ Jays (Cyanocitta
cristata) playing Prisoner's Dilemma games. (A) Freely behaving subjects played against either
tit-for-tat or defector stooges and food rewards were either dispensed after every trial or accumulated over four trials. (B) Whereas cooperation decreased over time in all other conditions,
cooperation was maintained when subjects played against a tit-for-tat stooge and when food
accumulated. This suggests that cooperation depends on opponent strategy as well as temporal
discounting. (Adapted from Stephens et aI., 2002 with permission from the American Association for the Advancement of Science.)
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of the game played shows that their responses are contingent upon the payoffs associated with each game.
Clements and Stephens's results show how cooperation depends upon the relative
costs and benefits of different strategies. When cooperation yields the highest possible payoff, jays do not defect. Mutual cooperation is the only reasonable option. In
contrast, when there is a temptation to defect, as defined by the Prisoner's Dilemma,
then jays are incapable of maintaining a cooperative relationship.
To determine if other conditions might enable cooperation among jays in the Prisoner's Dilemma, Stephens and colleagues ran a second experiment (Stephens, McLinn
& Stevens, 2002), this time targeting a potential constraint on the evolution and stability of reciprocal altruism: the temptation to take an immediate benefit outweighs
the benefits of waiting for a larger payoff. Numerous studies of animals and humans,
discussed more fully below, reveal that waiting for a payoff devalues this item's worth.
A small payoff now is better than a large payoff later. This trade-off between time and
value is called discounting, and is a central idea in economic models of choice. In the
original jay work, pecking brought an immediate payoff of some amount. In the new
study, payoffs accumulated. To obtain food, each pair of jays had to play several rounds
with their partner before obtaining the payoffs, thereby removing the immediate
temptation. In addition, the jays played against a partner that either always defected
or played tit-for-tat. The jays cooperated only when the food rewards accumulated
and when playing against a tit-for-tat partner (figure 9.2B). They solved the repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma.
Clements and Stephens concluded their original paper on jays as follows: "[T]here
is no empirical evidence of non-kin cooperation in a situation, natural or contrived,
where the payoffs are known to conform to a Prisoner's Dilemma" (p. 533). The followup studies with jays led Stephens and colleagues to a different conclusion, but one
that is consistent with the idea that animals are incapable of maintaining reciprocal
relationships under natural conditions: "Our work suggests that the timing of benefits can be the difference between stable cooperation and cooperation that erodes to
mutual defection" (p. 2218). The authors also point out that "the experimental machinations required to stabilize cooperation ... are special" (p. 2218). In other words,
nature may never provide animals with the right conditions for reciprocally stable
relationships.
Food Sharing in Capuchins

A third example comes from a social primate-the capuchin monkey. Capuchins live
in multimale, rriultif~ale social groups with a polygynous mating system. They are
a highly dexterous spfcies, and in the wild, hunt in groups and often share food. De
Waal attempted to 1apitalize on their apparent social intelligence by conducting a
series of experiments on cooperation. In the first experiment (de Waal & Berger, 2000),

<
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female capuchins had to work for food, either on their own or with another unrelated
individual. The task was simple: pull a rod to bring a cup of food within reach. When
there were two capuchins and therefore two rods, each individual had to pull at the
same time in order to bring the cups within reach. When the experimenter placed
food in both cups, both capuchins pulled. Although their joint action is cooperative,
it can more readily be explained as selfish, with each individual pulling for herself.
When the experimenter placed food in only one cup, the individual lined up with the
food almost always pulled whereas the other individual pulled less frequently. Importantly, however, when the player facing an empty cup pulled, she was more likely to
obtain food from the other capuchin than when she failed to help. Individuals with
access to the food cup rarely handed food to helpers. Instead, they approached helpers
and allowed them to grab pieces of food through the partition as it fell to the ground.
Allowing another individual to take food is psychologically different from giving
food. For one, tolerated taking is more difficult to interpret with respect to the motivations or intentions of the possessor. On some occasions, perhaps the possessor did
not intend to have food taken but was simply not swift enough to stop the action.
Giving, in contrast, is clear-cut, and represents a cost of physical exertion as well as a
reduction in one's own resources. In almost 10,000 observations of food transfer, less
than 1 percent involved giving. Nonetheless, this experiment shows that capuchins
are more likely to tolerate food-taking by an individual who helped them pull in the
past.
To explore the contingency part of the capuchin's interactions, as well as the role
of food quality, de Waal and colleagues ran other experiments (de Waal, 1997). Individuals were more likely to tolerate food taking when lower quality food items were
at stake. Among female-female pairs, individual A was more likely to allow individual
B to take food if on the previous run, individual B allowed A to take food. This relationship or correlation accounted for less than 10 percent of the variation in behavior, suggesting that many other factors influence whether or not two females tolerate
food-taking; for example, since de Waal did not observe the players before or after the
game, we do not know if tolerated food-taking was repaid in some other currency such
as grooming. Moreover, if two males or a male and female played this game, then tolerated food-taking was not at all contingent on prior food-taking.
A second complication associated with the capuchin studies is that the analyses
focus on tolerated food-taking, independently of how much food was taken. Although
de Waal reports that the food possessor generally "ate the lion's share," it might well
be important to know how much food the nonfood possessor obtained in each of the
conditions, as opposed to whether or not it received any food. One might imagine,
for instance, that the amount of food taken depends on its quality, on the amount
obtained in previous runs, on the food possessor's hunger level, expectations about
the number of games to be played in the future, and so forth.
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De Waal's work shows that capuchins will tolerate food taking from others, and that
this behavior has something to do with the help received on the rod-pulling task.
Capuchins clearly cooperate. There are, however, three reasons why we believe that
the capuchin work falls short of the required evidence for reciprocation. One: although
there is some evidence for reciprocated food exchange, it happens infrequently and
is restricted to female-female pairs. Two: Female-female cooperation in captivity may
be the by-product of kin selection in nature. Although the females in de Waal's groups
were genetically unrelated, in nature, females living in a social group are typically kin.
Among most primate species, including capuchins, females stay in their natal groups
for life, whereas males emigrate; this leads to groups consisting of closely related
females and distantly related males. Reciprocation among female-female pairs could,
therefore, be an artificial by-product of selection for kin interactions. It is unclear
whether it plays any role in natural groups of capuchins, and if it does, whether it is
dwarfed by cooperation among kin. Three: because there is little cost to pulling the
rod, and food exchange occurs most frequently when food quality is poor (costs of
exchange are low), it is not clear that this task involves altruistic actions; neither the
pulling by the helper, nor the tolerated taking of low quality food by the owner, are
costly. These three points lead, we suggest, to the conclusion that reciprocal altruism
is a weak force in capuchin social relationships.
Food-Giving in Tamarins

A final example comes from another social primate-the cotton-top tamarin. Unlike
capuchins that live in large social groups, characterized by polygamous mating behavior, tamarins live in small groups characterized by monogamy. Within groups, which
consist of the breeding pair and typically, one to two generations of offspring, older
offspring help rear the younger ones. Part of the help comes in the form of food"
sharing (Feistner & Price, 1990; Roush & Snowdon, 200.1). To explore the possibility
of reciprocal altruism in tamarins, Hauser and colleagues designed a series of experiments focused on the problem of food exchange (Hauser, Chen, Chen, & Chuang,
2003). Each experiment set up a game between unrelated tamarins in which one
animal-the actor-could pull a tool to give food to an unrelated recipient without
getting any food for self; pulling the tool is thus altruistic (figure 9.3). Why would
unrelated tamarins give each other food?
In the first test, an experimenter trained two tamarin stooges to function as players
with diametrically opposite roles: one acted as a unilateral altruist, always pulling the
tool to give food to its partner, and the other acted as a unilateral defector, never
pulling the tool.' The reason for training was simple: if tamarins give food to others
based on previous actS
of kindness, then they should give most to the altruist and
I
least or nothing to tbe defector. Supporting this prediction, tamarins pulled the tool
most often for the altruist and infrequently for the defector. This shows two things:
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Hauser et a1. (2003) tested an altruism game in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) . (A)
Tamarins had the option to pull a tool, thereby giving food to an unrelated tamarin but receiving nothing in return. Subjects played against an altruist stooge that always pulled or a defector
stooges that never pulled. (B) The tamarins consistently pulled more often for the altruist stooge
than the defector stooge, suggesting that their propensity to cooperate is contingent on their
partner's behavior. (Redrawn from Hauser et aI., 2003 with permission from the Royal Society of
London.)
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tamarins give food to unrelated others, and do so based on contingent acts of giving
in the past. Is this reciprocal altruism? Not yet. Perhaps tamarins feel more generous
when they eat more? When the altruist plays, she gives food on every trial. Her partner
must feel good. When a tamarin feels good, it is more likely to pull the tool and give
food back. What looks like reciprocation based on an altruistic act of food giving is
actually a dumb by-product of feeling good-feeling sated.
To test the "feel good" explanation, Hauser and colleagues ran other experiments,
this time leaving the stooges out, and using untrained pairs instead. In one game,
player A could pull the tool to obtain a piece of food for self and simultaneously deliver
three pieces to player B. On the next trial, player B could pull the tool to give two
pieces to player A, but obtain nothing for self. Given these payoffs, reciprocal pulling
would pay as each player would obtain three pieces of food after a complete round.
Animals in the player A role should always pull out of selfish interest to get food; they
did. If feeling good motivates giving food, then player B should cooperate and pull
because player A always gives them food-player A looks like a unilateral altruist from
one perspective. If player B notices, however, that player A is pulling out of selfish
interest-nothing like the unilateral altruist-then player B shouldn't cooperate.
Animals in the player B role don't cooperate. Feeling good isn't enough to set reciprocation in motion. And for food giving to count, it can't be an accidental by-product
of selfish behavior. It must be given with an altruistic intent. Although we may be
equally happy to acquire a $100 bill from a person who hands it to us and from
someone who aCCidentally drops it from his wallet while running by, most of us would
be inspired to cooperate with the first and not with the second. Tamarins see the world
in the same way.
Tamarins give food to unrelated others. Giving is not the simple by-product of
feeling good. Giving depends on whether food was given in the past, and how it was
given. Although these findings address many of the essential ingredients of Trivers's
account, a closer look at the patterns of giving reveal the signature of an unstable
system. When the tamarins play against the unilateral altruist, they don't respond
with unilateral cooperation as one might expect given the level of generosity. They
cooperate less than 50 percent of the time, and as each game progresses, the amount
of food giving drops. This decline represents the signature of most games of cooperation developed by economists. If we repeatedly cooperate to achieve some goalhunting a gazelle, let's say-then it pays to defect on the last interaction because the
relationship is ending. But if I think through this logic right before the last opportunity to interact, th~n I WillI surely think about defecting on the second to last opportunity, and the third t~ last, and so on. Cooperation unravels. We see this same
unraveling with the ta~arins. A further sign of vulnerability comes from the experiments with the untrained pairs. Here, cooperation ends if one of the players defects
on two consecutive opportunities to pull, a pattern that happens often. Like the jays,
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tamarins can maintain some level of cooperation under some restricted conditions.
Overall, however, it is an unstable system. And although tamarins naturally give food
to each other in the wild and in captivity, providing a certain level of ecological validity, tamarins in nature will rarely have the opportunity to reciprocate with unrelated
animals, with the exception of their mates and possibly a sneaky mating with a neighbor. Thus, although tamarins have evolved some of the necessary psychological
ingredients for reciprocal altruism-detecting cheaters, calculating contingencies, distinguishing between accidental and intentional actions-it is unlikely that these
mechanisms evolved for reciprocal altruism. They may, however, have evolved to solve
kin-based interactions.
How Common Is Reciprocity?

Despite these examples and the enormous theoretical interest in cooperation and reciprocity in the Prisoner's Dilemma, very little empirical evidence supports the theory
for nonhuman animals. Most instances of putative reciprocity have either not been
replicated or can be accounted for by simpler mechanisms. For example, one of the
first observations of reciprocity involved alliance formation in olive baboons (Packer,
1977). Packer found that when soliciting help to separate a female from a mating pair,
males tended to choose the same partners and alternate which partner solicited help
to gain access to the female. A similar analysis on the closely related yellow baboon
failed to find this reCiprocal relationship (Bercovitch, 1988), and another study suggested that coalition formation is not a Prisoner's Dilemma at all (Noe, 1990). Another
case of reciprocity involved predator inspection in fish (Dugatkin, 1991; Milinski,
1987). Milinski and Dugatkin have contended that some species of fish take turns
potentially risking their safety by approaching predators. However, others suggest that
this behavior can be explained by simpler mechanisms such as group cohesion
(Lazarus & Metcalfe, 1990; Stephens, Anderson, & Benson, 1997). None of these pointcounterpoint cases settles the issue. They do, however, leave us with doubts concerning the significance of reciprocity for animal social relationships.
Given the theoretical feasibility and the ubiquity of human reciprocity, why do we
not find much evidence of nonhuman animals reciprocating (Hammerstein, 2003)?
We propose two hypotheses: (1) researchers have not used the appropriate species
and/or methodology to find reciprocity or (2) reciprocity is too cognitively demanding for most, if not all nonhuman animals. The first hypothesis is unlikely for a
number of reasons. First, theory predicts that reciprocity could apply to a variety of
species from bacteria to primates-theoretically, there are few constraints limiting
which species should be able to reCiprocate. Because of this, cooperation has been
investigated in a large number of species including invertebrates, fish, birds, and many
mammal species. Second, researchers have used a number of methodological tech-
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niques to investigate cooperation, ranging from observation to natural experiments
to highly controlled laboratory experiments. The breadth of species and techniques
used suggests that the lack of evidence for reciprocity is not because we have not
looked carefully.
We propose that reciprocity is a deceptively simple-sounding strategy that is intuitively appealing but cognitively complex. Reciprocity may, in fact, require a complicated suite of cognitive abilities that may limit its utilization by many animal species.
Cognitive Constraints on Cooperation

Cognitive abilities are clearly important in constraining animal behavior, and a resurgence of interest in integrating proximate and ultimate questions proves this point
(Krebs & Davies, 1997). To investigate how these constraints influence cooperation
and reciprocity, we must break this difficult problem down into its component parts.
Here we examine a suite of cognitive abilities necessary to implement reciprocal strategies. Although reciprocity may tap cognitive abilities such as memory, cheater detection, social learning, and theory of mind, we focus on three constraints supported by
a considerable amount of evidence: inhibitory control, temporal discounting, and
numerical discrimination.
Inhibitory Control

Consider the following deal. In my left hand I am holding a $100 bill and in my right,
a $1 bill. I say nothing at all, but give you an inviting wink that suggests you should
reach for the money. Your instinct is surely to reach for the $100 bill. When you do,
I pull this hand back and offer you the $1 bill. What would happen the second time
around? Would you reach for the $100 bill again, or switch strategies and see what
happens? Puzzled by the first outcome, you might reach again for the $100, and then~'
rediscover that you are offered the $1 bill. Soon enough, you would switch, reaching
for the $1 bill and obtaining the $100 bill. You would now have a hunch about what
is going on. You would surmise that the best strategy is to pick the amount you don't
want to get the amount you want. You have acquired a new rule to solve this task.
But you have accomplished this task by overriding an old rule. We believe that this
kind of problem, which requires resolving conflict and inhibitory control, is a core
component of reCiprocation, and may provide one explanation for why animals have
difficulty.
The psycholo~ist Sally Boysen (see chapter 10, this volume) ran this experiment with
>t
adult chimpanzees u,~ing food treats rather than dollar bills. Boysen assumed that
chimpanzees were qighly motivated for food and would choose the hand with less
food to obtain the hand with more food. Precisely the opposite occurred. The choosers
reached for the larger quantity of food and consistently received the smaller quantity.
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We can explain this pattern of choice in two ways: either the choosers are exceptionally altruistic, intending to give away the larger stash of food, or they are incapable of controlling their desire to reach for the larger amount of food. The inhibitory
challenge here is motivational, as the chimpanzees have evolved brains and stomachs
designed to maximize the amount of food consumed. But Boysen's "reverse contingency" task requires the chimpanzees to overcome either an overlearned or innate
response to reach for larger quantities of food over smaller quantities. If two simultaneously available patches of food differ only in terms of their quantities, no animal
would feed in the patch with less food. But this is precisely what Boysen's task
demands. Apparently, these chimpanzees are incapable of overriding the desire to
reach for more food.
An alternative explanation is that Boysen's assumption that the chimpanzees were
motivated for food was invalid. After all, they are fed every day, and even if they point
to the larger quantity of food, they are still rewarded with the smaller quantity. Would
they eventually learn to pOint to the smaller quantity of food if they received nothing
at all after pointing to the larger quantity? Can other species solve this task? When
other species-Japanese macaques, squirrel monkeys and cotton-top tamarins-are
tested on Boysen's task, all fail, picking the larger quantity of food and getting stuck
with the smaller quantity (Anderson, Awazu, & Kazuo, 2000; Kralik, Hauser, & Zimlicki, 2002; Silberberg & Fujita, 1996). But if the experimenter imposes a cost, withholding all food when subjects pick the larger quantity, macaques and squirrel
monkeys eventually learn to pick the smaller quantity; tamarins stick with the losing
strategy, picking the larger and getting nothing at all. This suggests that part of the
chimpanzee's failure to point to the smaller quantity is due to the lack of costs associated with pointing to the larger quantity.
To solve Boysen's task, individuals must first inhibit the impulse to reach for the
larger quantity and second, reach for the smaller but less desirable quantity. The primates' failure appears to be due to their underlying motivation for more food. This
hypothesis is strengthened by a second set of experiments. Boysen ran a different
version of the original task with chimpanzees that already knew the Arabic symbols
from 1 to 6. This time, instead of choosing between one food treat versus four treats,
the chimpanzees chose between a card with the number "I" written on its face and
a card with the number "4"; each card covered up the corresponding number of food
treats. The chimpanzees quickly learned to pick the number 1 card and received four
treats, indicating chimpanzees can learn a rule like, "Point to the one you don't want
to get the one you want." Therefore, it seems as though the difficulty of this task
results from the chimpanzees' strong motivation to reach for food rather than an
inability to learn the reverse-contingency rule.
Although Boysen's task does not pose a cooperative dilemma, it does set up an
inhibitory problem that individuals must solve in order to stabilize cooperation. The
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chooser must reach for the undesirable over the desirable food quantity, and then wait
a return. The first move can be likened to giving away food, the second step to waiting
for a reciprocated act (see the following discussion). The first move is costly to self,
the second is beneficial. In Boysen's task, the cost appears too great, the inhibitory
system too weak.
Temporal Discounting

A related topiC to the inhibition problem is temporal discounting (also considered in
studies of delayed gratification, impulsivity, and rate maximization)-a devaluing of
future rewards. Discounting often results in a preference for smaller, immediate
rewards over larger, delayed rewards. For example, imagine that a monkey encounters
an unripe fruit. Should it consume the fruit now or wait for it to ripen (Kacelnik,
2003)? Waiting would yield a higher fitness benefit (more sugars are available), but
the future is uncertain-another monkey may eat it; winds may knock it into a stream
below; a fungus may infest it, spoiling a perfectly good fruit. This uncertainty may
have provided a strong adaptive benefit for a preference for immediacy.
Given that the future is uncertain, should all organisms discount in the same way?
Although impulsivity is probably universal among animals, the rate of discountingthat is, how quickly animals devalue food over time-varies widely across species, ages,
and even context. In experiments that estimate discounting rate, subjects are presented with two stimuli: one associated with a small, immediate reward and the other
with a large, delayed reward. The discounting rate is "titrated" by incrementally
increasing the delay-to-large until subjects are indifferent between choosing the large
delayed reward and the small, immediate reward. Therefore, researchers can find indifference points between immediate and delayed rewards over a range of small and large
reward amounts. Pigeons and rats both discount future rewards quite highly (Mawr,
1987; Richards, Mitchell, de Wit, & Seiden, 1997)-sometimes devaluing a reward by
up to SO percent in the first second of delay!
Humans have a much lower discounting rate (Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991); it is
by no means constant, however. In fact, impulsivity changes with age-children are
much more impulsive than adults (Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999). Mischel
and colleagues have actually followed children to adulthood, measuring their impulsivity longitudinally (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). They have found that,
although impulsivity decreases with age, impulsive children tend to develop into
impulsive adults. In addition, impulsivity at a young age provides a reasonable
predictor of futute
, intelligence, social responsibility, resistance to temptation, and
response to stres~.
Discounting ~ not necessarily a static parameter that applies to any choice situation. Rather, it· can change choice preferences in different situations, thus the discounting rate is context-dependent. For example, blue jays are usually quite impulsive
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birds, preferring immediate to delayed rewards (Stephens & Mclinn, 2003). In the
autumn, however, jays switch from consuming every acorn they encounter to caching
them behind tree bark or under leaf litter. This example of context-specific discounting is common across a number of bird and mammal species. The economic paradigm
used to assess discounting also has profound effects on choice. Stephens and Mclinn
(2003) found that in three potentially equivalent economic scenarios,z blue jays acted
impulsively in one and exhibited more self-control in the other two. The time from
choice to reward greatly influenced discounting behavior in the jays even when the
overall reward rate was the same. The extreme variation found in human discounting
rates (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002) may also be attributed to our sensitivity to the economic context.
Many psychologists consider the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma as a type of discounting problem (Green, Price, & Hamburger, 1995i Rachlin, 2000). Individuals can choose
between the immediate reward of defecting (and gaining only P fitness units) or the
long-term reward of cooperating (and gaining R fitness units). Cross-sectional data on
human discounting and cooperation agree with this perspective. After using a titration experiment to establish individual discounting rates, Harris and Madden (2002)
found that these discounting rates correlated with cooperation levels-less impulsive
individuals cooperated more frequently.
Although Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) included a discounting parameter in their
original formulation of tit-for-tat, their parameter only considered the probability of
future interactions. Experimental evidence indicates that sheer repetition is not
enough to circumvent the discounting problemi other methods must be used to mitigate discounting. As mentioned earlier, Stephens and colleagues (2002) offered
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games to blue jays, using the same general approach as
in the Clements and Stephens's studies (figure 9.2). This time, however, they altered
the delay to payoff. They only found cooperation when the payoffs accumulated over
several trials. This accumulation technique reduced impulsivity in a discounting game
as well, suggesting that the jays could only cooperate when their natural discounting
tendencies were reduced. Baker and Rachlin (2002) also reduced discounting in
pigeons by decreasing the time between Prisoner Dilemma trials. When these intertrial intervals were short, the pigeons cooperated more frequently.
Recent theoretical and empirical evidence indicates that temporal discounting can
have profound influences on cooperation. This interface between biology, economics,
and psychology provides rich opportunities in which to ask important questions about
the nature of social choices, including the mechanisms that both facilitate and
constrain them. Beyond the theoretical insights we have sketched, these findings
also imply that discounting must be considered when designing appropriate tests of
cooperation.
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Numerical Discrimination

A challenge for reciprocal interactions lies in quantifying the economics of the
entities given and returned, and evaluating whether the exchange was equitable. For
example, if an altruist gives four apples and receives one back, this is not equitable,
and natural selection should eliminate this poor decision maker from the population.
Do animals count or quantify in these ways? If they do, then individuals can at least
assess equitable returns. If they don't, then either individuals are satisfied with some
return, regardless of amount, or they are open to defectors' giving back less than a fair
amount. The simple answer is that animals can count small numbers less than four
with precision, and large numbers greater than four with only an approximate sense,
with evidence for these two systems anchored in a wealth of behavioral and neurobiological studies (see chapters 6, 7, and 8).
Rats and pigeons can be trained to press a key for food. They can also be trained to
press the same key a number of times for food. However, animals make more errors
as the required number of presses increases (reviewed in Boysen & Capaldi, 1993).
When an experimenter requires a rat to press a key four times for food, it is usually
dead on, pressing exactly four most of the time, and on occasion, pressing three or
five times. In contrast, when the target number is 30, sometimes the rat presses 30
times, but often it presses somewhere between 20 and 40 times. We observe these patterns when the rat (or pigeon) has to count the number of presses, light flashes, or
tones, and when the task changes from counting to waiting a particular period of time
before pressing. What these studies show is that animals can count, but only approximately so. In terms of reciprocal exchanges, animals can quantify, approximately,
what was given and what was received. But does this map on to anything in the
natural world?
There are at least three naturally occurring situations where number would appear
to matter: aggressive competitions within and between groups, foraging for food, and
reCiprocal exchanges of resources in either the same or different currencies. In lions
and chimpanzees, two species that attack and kill foreign intruders, individuals attend
to the number of competitors. In lions, playback experiments in Tanzania show that
females respond more aggressively to one foreigner calling than to three foreigners
calling (McComb, Packer, & Pusey, 1994). In chimpanzees, a group of males is more
likely to approach and kill a foreign male if the attackers have a three to one advantage (Wilson, Hauser, & Wrangham, 2001). Within groups of dolphins, lions, and
many primate'-spec~s, two or three individuals will form coalitions to defeat either a
single dominant iR~ividual or a smaller coalition. Although these coalitions involve
small numbers, thfY nonetheless require some capacity to count the number of comI
petitors. And this capacity emerges in a naturally occurring, evolutionarily significant
context.
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Studies of foraging in animals show that individuals attempt to maximize the rate
of energetic returns, picking patches with more over less food (Stephens & Krebs,
1986). Since estimates of rates of return depend on quantifying the amount of food
consumed over time, we can ask whether animals count the pieces, guesstimate the
volume, or time the foraging periods in a patch. Hauser and colleagues (2000) showed
lone rhesus monkeys two opaque empty boxes and then put two pieces of apple into
one box and one piece of apple into the other. Subjects consistently picked the box
with two applesi they also picked the box with three apples over two, and four apples
over three. But when they were presented with five versus four apple pieces, some
animals picked four and some five. Without training, rhesus monkeys can count the
number of pieces of food, and spontaneously discriminate four from three, but not
larger numbers. But there's a problem. Perhaps the monkeys aren't counting at all.
Perhaps they are timing how long it takes to load up the box with four apples versus
three apples. Since it takes longer to place four pieces than three pieces, their internal
timer will tell them to pick the box with four. Although timing is an impressive calculation, and one that plays an important role in the lives of all animals, it is not the
same calculation as counting. But a simple experiment shows that number, not time,
controls their response. If you place four pieces of apple into one box and three pieces
of apple plus a rock into the other, equating time and the number of objects, rhesus
pick the box with four pieces of apple. Number, not time, is responsible for the rhesus
monkeys' preferences.
Based on an overwhelming number of carefully controlled experiments, it is now
fair to say that animals have a number sense. It is a capacity that, in our opinion, consists of two naturally available systems (for a recent review of this literature, see Hauser
& Spelke, in pressi for a different perspective, see chapter 6, this volume). One allows
animals to count up to about four with precisioni the second allows them to approximate number, but without any limits on magnitude. Humans, including both young
infants and mature adults, also have these two systems. But we have an additional
system that relies on language, and in particular, words for numbers. This third system
allows us to discriminate any two numbers with precision.
Returning to the problem of reciprocal altruism, we can now give a more specific
answer to the question of limits or constraints on reciprocation, especially with respect
to quantificational abilities. If and when animals engage in a bout of reciprocal
altruism, they will either be limited to small numbers of objects in cases where the
exchange must be precise (a banana for a banana), or they will be freed from this
constraint where approximate exchanges are tolerated. The same prediction holds
for cases where the currency is time, such as the duration of a grooming bout. If one
antelope grooms another for 10 minutes, the groomer will most likely accept-as
fair exchange, that is-a reciprocated grooming bout of between 8 and 12 minutes.
A cheater who shoots for a slightly shorter bout would, in the long run, win. And
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this selfish victory might well cause the demise of a potentially cooperative
society.
Neural Correlates of Cooperation

Given the cognitive constraints discussed, implementing reciprocal cooperative
strategies may prove difficult for many animal species. In cases in which we do see
reciprocation, the question remains: are reciprocators integrating all of these domaingeneral abilities or are they tapping domain-specific cognitive adaptations for cooperation? In other words, are some animals specialized to reciprocate? One way to
answer these questions is to delve into the brain to search for neural correlates of cooperative behavior. Although there are studies examining the neural correlates of
the cognitive components such as inhibition (Hauser, 1999; Roberts & Wallis, 2000),
temporal discounting (Manuck, Flory, Muldoon, & Ferrell, 2003), and numerical competence (Nieder, Freedman, & Miller, 2002; Sawamura, Shima, & Tanji, 2002), there
are no studies exploring the neurobiology of cooperation in nonhuman animals. For
this reason, here we focus on neuroeconomics-the neurobiology of economic decision making in humans-with the hope that it will shed some light on the possible
neural correlates in animals, and minimally, open the door to research in this area.
The logic is basically this: if we can document the necessary and sufficient circuitry
underlying human cooperation and reCiprocal interactions, then this provides one
way in which one species solved the problem of reciprocal altruism. Although other
animals may solve this problem by means of other circuitry, if animals are incapable
of maintaining reciprocally stable relationships, then understanding which part of the
circuitry is missing or deficient may help explain why.
Neuroeconomics of Cooperation

The emerging field of neuroeconomics integrates the latest technology of functional
neuroimaging and neuronal recordings with classical experimental economics to
determine how the brain makes economic decisions. Recently, economists and neuroscientists have collaborated to perform functional neuroimaging on human subjects
playing several different cooperative games. In all of these games, individuals can
choose to behave selfishly or altruistically. Because each game is either sequential or
repeated, recipients of the altruistic option have the opportunity to reciprocate-therefore, these are potentially games of reciprocity. Because this is a nascent field, the data
are limited to a few studies, and the causal relationship between brain area and function are still unclear. !f
Rilling and colleagu~s (2002) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to scan subjects that piayed repeated sequences of the Prisoner's Dilemma game shown
!
in figure 9.4A. Subjetts played against three partners: a freely behaving human, a
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(a)

Prisoner's Dilemma

Subject 2

C

D
(1,1)

(0,3) (3,0)

(2,2)

(b)
Trust game

Subject 1

(45,45)

R
(180,225)

(0.405)

(c)

Ultimatum game

Proposer
F

U
Responder

A
(5,5)

(0,0) (8,2)

R
(0,0)

Figure 9.4

Extended form of games in neuroeconomics experiments depicting the sequential choices of the
players. The nodes of the trees represent choice points for particular players. Dashed lines connecting nodes indicate that the player does not know her current position in the decision tree.
Payoffs are indicated in parentheses for subject 1 and subject 2, respectively. (A) In the Prisoner's
Dilemma, both subjects simultaneously choose either to cooperate (C) or defect (D). In this
example, subject 1 chooses C or D, and subject 2 chooses not knowing subject l's choice. The
equilibrium strategy is mutual defection for a one-shot game. (B) In the trust game, subject 1 can
choose left (L) and quit the game with a small payoff or choose right (R) to continue the game.
Subject 2 can then reciprocate subject 1 's trust by choosing L to receive a moderate payoff or
break subject l's trust by choosing R to receive a large payoff. The equilibrium strategy is for
subject 1 to choose L and quit the game. (C) For the ultimatum game, the proposer submits either
a fair (F) or unfair (U) offer. The responder can either accept (A) that offer and distribute the
earnings or reject (R) the offer, discarding the earnings for both players. Proposing an unfair offer
and accepting any nonzero offer are the equilibrium strategies. Iterated play can lead to stable
cooperation and reciprocation in all three games.
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human stooge that began cooperating but defected after three consecutive mutually
cooperative moves, and a computer playing tit-for-tat. Against both human partners,
subjects initially cooperated but reduced cooperation in later trials. When playing the
computer, subjects initially defected, then increased cooperation, only to defect in the
final trials. Mutual cooperation with human partners was associated with activation
in both the anteroventral striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex (Brodmann Area 11)
more than the other three possible outcomes; both of these areas have been implicated as playing a significant role in reward (Damasio, 1994; Rolls, 1999). Only the
orbitofrontal cortex, however, was activated by mutual cooperation with a computer
partner. Reciprocating a partner's previous cooperation increased activation in the
anterior caudate, the postcentral gyrus (BA 1/3), the anterior cingulate cortex (BA 25),
and the anteroventral striatum. Again, these areas playa role in reward assessment,
and significantly, in resolving conflict when there are alternative moves. In our
opinion, these data do not provide any additional explanatory power with respect to
the psychology and economics of decision making. They do, however, provide new
insights into the neural correlates, and these are important with respect to both comparative and developmental data: Are similar areas activated in animals playing the
same game? What about human children at different ages?
In the Prisoner's Dilemma, both subjects choose simultaneously and therefore do
not know their partner's choice. In a closely related "trust" game, subjects move
sequentially, so that the second player to choose can reciprocate the first player's kindness. For example, McCabe and colleagues (2001) imaged subjects playing the trust
game shown in figure 9.4B. Subjects played against a human partner and against a
computer playing a known, probabilistic strategy. Although they do not describe the
behavioral results, previous studies show that the first player cooperates in about 50
percent of the trials, and the second player reciprocates in 75 percent of those tri~ls
(McCabe & Smith, 2000). No data were presented on contrasting behavioral respa,nses
to human and computer partners. Subjects that cooperated on at least one third of
the trials showed increased activation in the occipital lobe (BA 17, 18), the parietal
lobe (BA 7), the thalamus, the middle frontal gyrus, and the frontal pole (BA 10) when
playing against a human rather than a computer. The authors suggest that because of
selective activation in the prefrontal cortex specifically when cooperating with a
human partner, the trust game may recruit theory of mind modules such as sharedattention mechanisms. Although intriguing, these results leave several issues unresolved. For example, does the trust game require a theory of mind? Would autistics,
who show a deficit in theory of mind type tasks, make similar decisions as do nonautistics in the tfust glme? What about normal children, below the age of approximately
five years, who h,~ve yet to acquire a full-blown theory of mind? Given that the prefrontal cortex a~~ plays a significant role in inhibition (see above), and that one of
I
the problems fa¢ing both autistics and young children with respect to theory of mind
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tasks is an inhibitory one, could prefrontal activation reflect inhibitory mechanisms
as opposed to theory of mind systems? Why do the other areas of the brain show high
levels of activation only against human partners?
A commonly analyzed cooperative game-the Ultimatum Game-examines how
individuals value fairness. In this game, the first player (the proposer) is given an
amount of money to split between herself and the second player (the responder). After
proposing a split, the responder can either accept the offer or reject it, thereby preventing either player from receiving any money (figure 9.4C). Economic theory predicts that the proposer's offer should be the smallest possible amount to the responder,
and the responder should accept any positive offer. After all, both players benefitwhy look a gift horse in the mouth? Surprisingly, in experimental game situations,
proposers tend to offer approximately 50: 50 splits, and responders often reject offers
lower than 20 percent of the stake (reviewed in Camerer, 2003).
Sanfey and colleagues (2003) scanned subjects playing ultimatum games against
human and computer partners. The human and computer partners acted only as proposers, playing a fixed strategy of offering either fair 5: 5 splits of ten dollars or offering unfair splits of 9: 1, 8: 2, or 7: 3. Subjects acted as responders, accepting the fair
offer and increasing rejection as the offers became more unfair; however, they treated
human and computer proposers differently by rejecting more unfair offers from
human partners. Unfair offers from human partners were associated with activation
in the bilateral anterior insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 46), and anterior cingulate cortex (BA 24/32); again, these areas are significantly involved in emotional regulation, choice and in resolving conflict. There was greater activation in the anterior
insula for unfair offers from human partners than computer partners. Insular activation was also associated with rejecting unfair offers; the authors contend that this
activation corresponds to negative emotional states such as pain, distress, anger, and
especially disgust. They also state that activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
indicates a conflict between its "executive control" functions and the insular emotional reactions. At the level of function, these results are not surprising. Playing the
Ultimatum Game involves resolving a conflict between selfishly keeping the larger
proportion of the initial pot and being generous; it also involves emotion, especially
on the part of the recipient who obtains either a fair or unfair offer. It was therefore
expected that the circuitry underlying decision making, conflict resolution, and
emotion would activate in this task. Nonetheless, this study pinpoints some of the
necessary substrates for cooperation, opening the door to both comparative and developmental studies.
Cooperation and the Brain
Since neuroeconomics is in its infancy, there is no clear computational theory predicting how cooperation is processed and represented in the brain (but see McCabe,
2003). This is evident by the piecemeal findings of these first studies of the neuroe-
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conomics of cooperation. In all of the games presented here, economic theory predicts selfishness, but experimental results show that people tend to cooperate well
above expected levels. Despite these similarities in behavior, the neuroeconomic
studies reviewed here all cite different cognitive components in their results: rewardcenter processing, executive control, emotional centers, and conflict-resolution areas.
Perhaps these disparities simply reflect the growing pains associated with integrating
neuroscience and economics, especially the psychology of decision making and choice
(Glimcher, 2003).
Although neuroimaging studies can provide interesting correlates of behavior,
causality is difficult to infer. Neuronal recordings of candidate brain centers in nonhumans can offer more direct assessment of neuronal activity and can provide an evolutionary framework for understanding the cooperative brain. One potentially fruitful
avenue might be through the mirror neuron system located in the premotor cortex
of macaques and humans (see chapter 11 for specific details). This part of the brain is
equipped with neurons that fire when an individual performs a particular action or
when the subject sees an individual perform the exact same action. These neurons fire
for action and perception. We tentatively propose that they could provide a necessary,
but not sufficient piece of circuitry for reciprocal altruism. For example, there are
mirror neurons that only respond when a hand grasps a piece of food, rotates around
a piece of food, displaces food, or releases food. Other neurons fire only when a hand
grasps an object with index finger and thumb, and not at all when a pair of pliers,
held by a hand, grasps the object in the same way. Some neurons even fire when the
complete trajectory of the action is concealed, thereby causing the animal to infer or
predict the intended action relative to the target object. Together, the fine coding of
these mirror neurons suggests that the premo tor cortex provides a warehouse of motor
commands, a library of action manuals. Given the symmetry between action and perception in the tamarin task, it is possible that the mirror neuron system was engaged.
Actor A pulls the tool and gives food to animal B. As animal B watches, A's pull
triggers a matched response in B, thereby beginning the mirror neuron loop. This
explanation might provide the most parsimonious explanation for the origins of this
system. Others have argued that it evolved for imitation and theory of mind, two
capacities that macaques lack. It would therefore be of interest to run the tamarin
reciprocation experiment while individuals are in a scanner. The strong prediction is
that seeing one's partner pull will activate the mirror neuron system as the perceiver's
action system clicks into gear.
Conclusions <,

if

Cooperation is q(tite common in both human and nonhuman societies (Dugatkin,
I
1997). We argue,' however, that most instances of animal cooperation can be attributed to selfish benefits or indirect benefits via helping kin. True altruistic cooperation
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maintained by reciprocity is rare if not absent among animals, despite its ubiquity in
humans. We propose that cognitive constraints on animal inhibition, temporal discounting, numerical discrimination, memory, cheater detection, punishment, theory
of mind, and other components may limit the ability of many species to implement'
and maintain reciprocally altruistic strategies. In particular, animals have difficulty
inhibiting the tendency to choose large amounts of food when available. This inhibition problem could pose a challenge for making altruistic decisions that require
forgoing large rewards for smaller rewards. In addition, animals often highly discount
future rewards. The extreme preference for immediacy exhibited by many species
makes waiting for reciprocated rewards very difficult. Finally, precise numerical competence in animals is restricted to small quantities-larger quantities are estimated.
When exchanging rewards in cooperative situations requires precision, the quantities
in question may be limited to small numbers. These and other faculties may be necessary components of our capacity to reciprocate. If correct, then comparative research
must illuminate which components are shared with other animals, which are unique
to humans, and why certain components evolved in our species and no other.
Although the crocodile, lion, chimpanzee, and Maasai warrior may all cooperate
during a hunt, only the Maasai may engage a uniq~ely human, domain-specific specialization for cooperation.
We can now return to a question raised earlier on: What·· kinds of cognitive
specializations, if any, are required for reciprocation? One approach to answer this
question is to assess what happens in the brain when individuals are placed in cooperative games. Although we know little about how animals make decisions in these
games, the burgeoning field of neuroeconomics is elucidating the role of the human
brain in reciprocal games. Neuroimaging studies of the Prisoner's Dilemma, trust
games, ultimatum games, and investment games implicate various areas of the prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex, and striata among others. While interesting, these
studies provide only correlational inferences concerning the relationship between
brain activation and decision-making behavior. The timing of activation-whether it
occurred at the time of the decision or is a consequence of the decision-is unclear.
The real power of these studies lies in their implications for comparative and developmental questions. Does activation correlate with decision making in nonhuman
animals playing similar games? Does activation change over the lifespan of an individual human? That is, as these brain centers come online in children, how does their
decision making change? These types of questions get at the heart of a cognitive theory
of reciprocity.
These cognitive and neurobiological analyses provide interesting insights into
the economics, psychology, and evolution of altruistic cooperation. Ultimately,
understanding the nature of human cooperation will require cooperation among
disciplines.
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Notes
1. A growing group of economists and anthropologists have argued that Triversian reciprocity is
actually selfish as the initial altruistic act is made with the explicit expectation that the recipient will return the favor. Humans appear to have evolved a different, and apparently unique
form of cooperation called strong reciprocity, defined recently by Gintis and colleagues (2003) as
a "predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid
either by others or at a later date."

2. By "potentially equivalent economic scenarios" we mean that the overall intake rate for the
animals is the same for each scenario given a particular strategy. For example, if the animal
chooses the small reward every time, it would receive the same amount of food over a given time
period in all three scenarios.
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